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SOM.1	 Precedent	 for	 this	 move	 can	 be	 found	 in	 an	 unlikely	 place,	
namely	 in	René	Descartes’	philosophy,	 for	Descartes	so	diminished	
the	role	of	 the	senses	 in	gaining	knowledge	that	SOM	is	precluded	
from	 becoming	 a	 self-standing	 skeptical	 challenge.	 At	 most,	 SOM	
is	just	one	more	incarnation	of	skepticism	about	the	external	world.	
Further,	Descartes	 rejected	 the	natural	possibility	of	 a	human	body	
existing	without	a	mind.	We	are	all	familiar	with	the	real	distinction	
between	 body	 and	mind,	 which,	 at	 first	 blush,	 speaks	 against	 this	
claim,	but	while	a	body	in	general	can	exist	without	a	mind,	a	unique-
ly	human	body	 cannot.	Descartes	 indicated	 all	 this	 in	 a	number	of	









contrary,	 it	 looks	 to	be	a	unique	object	 that,	 in	 its	entirety,	belongs	
neither	to	the	metaphysician	nor	to	the	physicist.









































4.	 Although	 I	am	 focusing	here	on	 the	epistemological	problem,	Descartes	 is	
not	without	an	answer	to	the	conceptual	problem.	Roughly,	Descartes	would	




Searle’s	 recent	 Mind: A Brief Introduction	 links	 Descartes	 to	 SOM	 (Searle	
2004,	Chapter	1).
mind.	In	sections	three	and	four,	I	supplement	this	claim	by	arguing	
that	 Descartes	 did	 not	 distinguish	 SOM	 from	 skepticism	 about	 the	
external	world	in	any	of	his	published	work.	In	particular,	in	section	


















2. SOM: A brief history
There	are	a	variety	of	ways	to	demarcate	SOM.	I	am	interested	in	dis-
cussing	the epistemological problem,	and	I	will	proceed	on	the	assump-
tion	 that	 it	 is	 synonymous	with	SOM.	The	question	motivating	 this	
problem	relates	to	how	we	know	other	minds	exist:	What	justifies	our	
belief	that	a	given	body	has	a	mind	or	thinks?	It	is	this	version	of	the	
problem	of	other	minds	 for	which	we	have	 competing	historical	 ac-
counts.	One	finds,	for	example,	Thomas	Buford	introducing	an	anthol-
ogy	on	philosophical	issues	related	to	other	minds	with	the	suggestion	
2.	 See	 Desmond	 Clarke’s	 recent	 work	 for	 a	 comparison	 between	 Descartes’	
views	on	animal	souls	and	the	views	of	Montaigne	and	Charron	(Clarke	2003,	
72ff,	and	Clarke	2006,	334–335).
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The	 absence	 of	 such	 a	 proof	 troubled	 the	 first-generation	 Car-
tesian	Gerauld	 de	 Cordemoy.10	 In	 fact,	 Cordemoy	 became	 the	 first	
seventeenth-century	 figure,	 and	 perhaps	 the	 very	 first	 person	 ever,	
to	give	an	unambiguous	formulation	of	SOM.	Writing	eighteen	years	
after	Descartes’	 death,	Cordemoy	begins	 his	Discours Physique de la 
Parole (Discours):
Amongst	the	Bodies,	I	see	in	the	World,	I	perceive	some,	
that	 are	 in	 all	 things	 like	mine,	 and	 I	 confess,	 I	 have	 a	
great	inclination	to	believe,	that	they	are	united	to	minds,	
as	mine	 is.	But	when	 I	 come	 to	consider,	 that	my	Body	
hath	so	many	operations	distinct	from	those	of	my	mind,	













10.	Cordemoy	 is	 little	discussed	 in	 the	English-speaking	world	apart	 from	 in-
frequent	references	to	his	atomism,	his	occasionalism	or	his	role	in	the	cor-

















tions	 for	an	explicit	proof,	 let	alone	 for	evidence,	 that	other	minds	
exist.	 In	the	Second	Replies,	Descartes	even	acknowledges	that	“in	
my	Meditations…my	 supposition	was	 that	 no	 other	 human	 beings	
[homines]	were	yet	known	to	me”.7	Nevertheless,	Descartes	uses	the	
first-person	plural	a	number	of	times	after	Meditation	Two,	as	if	other	
human	beings	are	known	 to	him.8	Whatever	we	make	of	 this	 shift	
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The	 most	 obvious	 assumption	 relevant	 to	 SOM	 is	 the	 privilege	








likewise	 identifies	 this	privilege	as	 a	 condition	 for	SOM.	Lacking	 “a	















Countless	 of	 our	 beliefs	 lack	 a	 specific	 justification	 after	Medita-





am	putting	 to	Cordemoy.	Like	a	work	of	mathematics	 that	 explains	



















are	 not	 comparable	 to	 the	 earth	 or	 the	 sky.	 The	 oversight	 that	Cor-
demoy	 identified	was	 that	 it	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 show	 that	 bodies	 exist	
but	something	else	to	show	that	minds	exist	attached	to	those	bodies.	
Descartes	equips	us	to	show	the	former	but	not	the	latter.




This	 is	 no	more	 a	 historical	 accident	 than	 the	 privileging	 of	 self-
knowledge	 in	the	generation	of	SOM.	The	threat	of	modern	or	post-
























point	when	he	uses	 the	 label	 “best	 case	of	knowledge”	 to	describe	 the	 tar-
get	of	skeptical	doubt	(Cavell	1979,	129ff.).	For	discussion	of	the	similarities	
and	differences	between	Academic	and	Pyrrhonian	skepticism	as	compared	




sense	 experience	 supplemented	with	 argument	 or	 inference	 or,	 in	
a	 word,	 indirectly.	 Cordemoy’s	 presentation	 of	 SOM	 assumes	 this	





















cours reveals	something	 less	obvious.	Cordemoy	believed	 that	SOM	
emerges	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 already-established	 existence	 of	 bod-
ies	“that	are	in	all	things	like	mine”.	It	is	these	bodies	whose	“actions”	


























make	such	a	claim.	Consider	 just	 the	case	of	 the	scholastic	Aristote-
lianism	that	dominated	in	educational	 institutions.	According	to	the	






































	 	 We	can	draw	a	similar	conclusion	 from	Bertrand	Russell’s	appeal	 to	 the	
argument	from	analogy:
	 	 We	 observe	 in	 ourselves	 such	 occurrences	 as	 remembering,	 rea-
soning,	 feeling	 pleasure,	 and	 feeling	 pain.	 We	 think	 that	 sticks	
and	 stones	 do	 not	 have	 these	 experiences,	 but	 that	 other	 peo-
ple	 do….It	 is	 clear	 that	 belief	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 others	 requires…
something	 that	 may	 be	 vaguely	 called	 “analogy.”	 The	 behavior	
of	 other	 people	 is	 in	many	 ways	 analogous	 to	 our	 own,	 and	 we	
suppose	 that	 it	 must	 have	 analogous	 causes.	 What	 people	 say	
is	what	we	 should	 say	 if	we	had	a	 certain	 thought,	 and	 so	we	 in-












Latin	 for	 “soul”	 is	anima,	 from	which	the	English	“animated”	derives.	
Souls,	in	turn,	were	differentiated	from	one	another	according	to	the	





















































corpse	 has	 an	Aristotelian	 scholastic	 form?	Descartes’	 substance-mode	 on-
tology	 is	 purposefully	 hostile	 to	 his	 predecessors’	 use	 of	matter	 and	 form,	
which	implies	he	rejects	(1)–(3),	yet,	in	a	number	of	places,	Descartes	refers	
to	the	human	soul	as	an	element	in	a	“substantial	union”	with	the	body	or	


























mere	 blindness	 to	 what	 you	 may	 still	 think	 an	 inevitable	 problem,	
however,	Descartes	had	good	reason	to	limit	his	attention	to	the	skep-
tical	problem	of	 the	external	world,	because	 the	same	strategies	 for	
acquiring	knowledge	 in	 that	case	apply	 in	every	other	context.	This	
section	builds	to	this	conclusion	by	examining	Descartes’	correspon-
dence	 and	especially	 the	Meditations	more	 closely.	The	next	 section	




In	a	 late	 letter	 to	Henry	More,	Descartes	made	his	most	explicit	
claim	about	our	access	to	the	minds	of	others.	The	subject	under	dis-
cussion	was	the	attributes	a	corporeal	substance	must	have	in	order	
to	 exist.	Opposing	Descartes’	 view	 from	 the	Principles of Philosophy 
(Principles)	that	the	primary	attribute	of	extension	alone	secures	the	
existence	of	corporeal	substance,	More	suggested	that	“some	proper-
ties	are	prior	to	others	/	proprietates alias alijs esse priores”.27	In	particular,	
as	 Descartes	 summarized	 his	 correspondent’s	 views,	More	 claimed	
26.	Frederick	Copleston	is	right	 that	“neither	 in	the	Meditations	nor	 in	the	Prin-
ciples of Philosophy	 does…[Descartes]	 treat	 specifically	 the	 problem	 of	 our	
knowledge	of	 the	existence	of	other	minds”.	Copleston	adds	 that	 “if	 called	
up,	[Descartes]	would	doubtless	produce	an…argument…[appealing]	to	the	








must	also	be	present.	Any	other	view	 is	 an	anathema	 to	Aristotelian	
hylomorphism.	As	 a	 result,	 scholastic	Aristotelianism	denies	 the	 pos-
sibility	of	a	mere	human	body	and	immunizes	itself	from	SOM.24















































whenever	 the	 existence	 of	 anything	 is	 in	 question	 besides	 the	 exis-
tence	of	the	“I”	and	“God”,	both	of	which	can	be	known	to	exist	without	








and	 this	might	 lead	me	 to	 conclude	without	more	 ado	
that	 knowledge	 of	 the	 wax	 comes	 from	 what	 the	 eye	
sees,	 and	not	 from	 the	 scrutiny	of	 the	mind	alone.	But	




conceal	 automatons.	 I	 judge	 that	 they	 are	men.	And	 so	
something	which	I	thought	I	was	seeing	with	my	eyes	is	
that	“being	perceivable	by	the	senses”	comes	before	extension.28	Des-
























































him	 good	 reason	 not	 to	 do	what	we	 saw	Cordemoy	 doing	 in	 sec-
tion	 two—namely,	 offer	 a	 specific	 response	 to	SOM.	For	Descartes,	
the	 important	 distinction	 among	 our	 various	 knowledge	 claims	 is	
drawn	between	those	that	we	can	know	immediately—the	“I”	(Medi-
tation	Two)	and	“God”	(Meditation	Five)—and	everything	else,	which	
requires	an	 inference.	The	existence	of	a	piece	of	wax	 is	 something	




















































class.	 But	Descartes	does	not	mean	 to	 imply	 that	 these	 lesser	 “pos-
sible	objects	of	 knowledge”	 cannot	be	proven	or	 established.	They	








To	sum	up	my	claims	 to	 this	point:	 I	have	argued	both	 that	Des-
cartes	does	not	consider	SOM	in	the	Meditations	and	that	there	is	no	



































that	 they	prove	what	 they	 establish—namely	 that	 there	
36.	The	fact	that	we	must	make	an	inference	in	both	cases	does	not	mean	the	two	
judgments	are	exactly	 the	same.	The	only	basis	on	which	such	 judgments	
could	be	made	 for	Descartes,	however,	 is	 either	practiced	 introspection	or	

















We	 can	 certainly	 conceive	of	 a	machine	 so	 constructed	
that	 it	utters	words,	and	even	utters	words	which	corre-


















simulation	 test	 have	 been	 noted	 and	 discussed	 by	 several	 scholars.	 Most	
recently,	 Darren	 Abramson	 has	 even	 suggested	 that	 Turing	 was	 directly	
influenced	 by	 Descartes	 (Abramson	 2011,	 which	 also	 summarizes	 the	 lit-
erature	 linking	Descartes	 and	Turing).	 I	would	 note,	 however,	 that	 Turing	
4. No SOM in Descartes’ Discourse
In	part	five	of	 the	Discourse,	Descartes	 synthesizes	 the	 results	of	his	
early	work	 in	physics.	Drawing	on	 the	 then-unpublished	World	 and	
Treatise on Man,	he	presents	his	cosmology	and	mechanical	account	of	
life	before	venturing	into	the	“difference	between	our	soul	and	that	of	
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inevitably	 fail	 in	 others,	 which	 would	 reveal	 that	 they	
were	 acting	 not	 through	 understanding	 but	 only	 from	
the	disposition	of	 their	organs.	For	whereas	 reason	 is	a	







ing	 actions	 their	 organs	 and	 parts	 are	 disposed	 to	 perform.	Where	
machines	are	not	successful	is	in	performing	actions	outside	of	their	
pre-set	or	designed	performance	 range.	Put	 another	way:	Descartes	






















cannot	 be	 conceived	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 arrangements	 and	 rearrange-
























is	distinguished	 from	 the	animals	by	 speech,	 this	had	already	been	 taught	
by	Pythagoras,	Plato,	Cicero,	Quintilian,	Galen,	and	others”	(Huet	2003,	221).	
For	 discussion	 of	 the	 early	modern	 interest	 in	 language	 and	 the	 language	
capacities	of	animals,	see	Serjeantson	2001.













…speech	 is	 the	only	certain	sign	of	 thought	hidden	 in	a	
body.	All	human	beings	use	it,	however	stupid	and	insane	
they	may	be,	even	though	they	may	have	no	tongue	and	






But	neither	do	 infants,	 at	 least	 for	many	months,	while	







49.	 “Nec infantes ulli, per aliquam multa saltem mensium spatia, quamvis plorent, ride-






er	he	 should.	As	 a	 result,	 the	Discourse	 is	 hardly	 a	 starting	point	 for	
SOM.	As	I	indicated	when	discussing	the	opening	passage	to	the	two	







5. Descartes’ answer to SOM







the	 attributes	 of	 corporeal	 substance.	 Rather,	 the	 subject	 under	 dis-
cussion	is	part	five	of	the	Discourse.	Quickly,	however,	the	topic	turns	
to	SOM.	In	this	section,	I	will	trace	this	movement	from	a	discussion	
















Discourse so	as	 to	avoid	being	 cornered	 into	accepting	 that	 infants	
either	use	language	or	lack	minds.	The	interpretation	I	offered	in	the	














by	the	example	of	 infants	 is	 just	that	there	is	no	strict	correlation	between	















53.	With	 the	 sole	 exception	 of	Alan	Gabbey,	 I	 know	of	 no	 commentator	who	
has	 taken	 the	 response	 to	More	 to	 hold	 any	 promise	 (Gabbey	 1990).	 The	
argument	I	reconstruct	is	indebted	to	Gabbey’s	work,	although	we	marshal	
to	say	of	infants?	How	do	we	know	that	other	minds	exist	in	this	case?	



















that they were of the same nature as adults [eiusdem naturae 
cum adultis];	but	animals	never	develop	to	a	point	where	
any	certain	sign	of	thought	can	be	detected	in	them.50
This	 reply	 is	 especially	 unhelpful	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 elaborate	what	






51.	 Gabbey	 1990	 offers	 a	 similar	 analysis,	 although	Margaret	Wilson	 puts	 the	
trouble	with	Descartes’	answer	best:	“The	claim	that	More	meant	to	support	


































58.	At	 least	 two	reasons	 to	question	my	particular	emphasis	on	complexio are	
adduced	 in	 note	 63	 below.	My	 account	 of	 the	 term’s	 origins relies	 upon	
The	key	to	Descartes’	salvation	lies	in	his	claim	that	he	recognized	in-
fants	“were	of	the	same	nature	as	adults	[eiusdem naturae cum adultis].”	













There	 is	 no	 explicit	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 in	 the	 secondary	 lit-
erature	 related	 to	Descartes,	 and	 current	English	 translations	of	 the	













55.	 “…per naturam enim, generaliter spectatam, nihil nunc aliud quam vel Deum ip-
sum, vel rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institutam intelligo; nec aliud per 
naturam meam in particulari, quam complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo 
sunt tribute”	(AT	VII	80,	CSM	II	56).
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we	share	 the	same	complexio.	We	share	 the	same	bodily	 constitution.	


















leging	 of	 self-knowledge	 and	 his	 dualism	between	mind	 and	 body	
as	setting	 the	stage	 for	SOM.	All	 the	 textual	evidence	canvassed	 to	
59.	 For	a	 thorough	account	of	Descartes’	knowledge	of	medicine,	 see	Aucante	
2006a.


















ties	 that	 characterize	 the	 temperaments	 of	 species	 and	 individuals;	







amounts	 to	 knowing	 its	 natural	 balance	 of	 fundamental	 qualities.	
Such	 knowledge	was	 central	 to	Galen’s	 scientific	medicine,	which	





Dictionnaire de l’Académie française	(1694)	read	simply,	“temperament,	
constitution	 du	 corps”.	 Similarly,	 Randle	Cotgrave’s	A Dictionary of 




in	 the	 medical	 tradition.	 Descartes	 was	 well	 acquainted	 with	 this	
Jacquart	1988.	
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doubts	“that	the	mind	begins	to	think	as	soon	as	it	is	infused [infusa est] 
in	the	body	of	an	infant”.62









ever,	 our	 complexio	 is	 a	blending	of	material	 elements	with	 the	mind.	His	
reading	is	supported	by	Descartes’	claim	later	in	Meditation	Six	to	limit	his	
discussion	of	our	complexio	to	just	“what	God	has	bestowed	on	me	as	a	com-
bination	of	mind	and	body	[ut composito ex mente & corpore]”	(AT	VII	82,	CSM	
II	 57).	 It	 arguably	 also	gains	 support	 from	 the	original	passage	 citing	 com-
plexio—“complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo sunt tribute	[sic]”—where	
the	relative	clause	goes	with	“eorum omnium”.	This	makes	it	seem	that	God’s	
bestowing	 “all	 the	 things”	 is	 emphasized	 and	 not	 the	 complexio	 that	 God	
gives	us.	I	make	the	case	for	my	interpretation	in	the	text	above.	Regardless	













God’s	 immutable	 nature	 is	 necessarily	 necessary.	 Sidestepping	 these	 con-
tentious	 issues,	what	matters	 for	my	argument	 is	 that,	 after	 the	 initial	 act	





























































Descartes’	 texts	where	he	 indicates	 that	 the	human	body	must	exist	
together	with	 a	 human	mind.	Consider	 just	 one	 example.68	Writing	
to	Regius,	Descartes	explains:	“…if	the	body	has	all	the	dispositions	
required	to	receive	a	soul,	and	without	which	it	is	not	strictly	a	human	


























To	 be	 clear:	 I	 am	 suggesting	 that	 our	 general	 understanding	 of	
God’s	 immutable	nature	coupled	with	the	 infant’s	having	been	natu-
rally	propagated	is	what	assures	us	that	the	infant	has	a	mind.	Does	










Nevertheless,	 if	 we	want	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of…
men,	it	is	much	better	to	consider	how	they	can	gradually	







corporeal	 substance	but,	 to	 the	contrary,	he	 repeatedly	 lists	motion	
among	 the	modes	 of	 a	 corporeal	 substance.73	Descartes’	 substance-
mode	ontology	is	not	easily	applied	to	the	case	of	 the	human	body	
and	the	human	mind,	yet,	perhaps,	something	similar	can	be	inferred	






human	bodies,	Descartes’	position	 is	not	 so	different	 from	 the	scho-
lastic	Aristotelian’s	position.	Both	Descartes	and	the	Aristotelians	take	















sensory	 experience.	Gary	Hatfield	has	 addressed	 this	 parallel	 question	on	










means	 that	 the	 essence	of	 the	human	body	 somehow	 includes	 the	
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